Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes Outline 1 Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing 2 Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes 3 Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes
Gauravaram and Knudsen Randomize-hash-then-sign schemes 2/ 22
Gauravaram and Knudsen Randomize-hash-then-sign schemes 3/ 22
Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes 
Yes/No
Gauravaram and Knudsen Randomize-hash-then-sign schemes 4/ 22
Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes Randomized hashing (Halevi and Krawczyk-Crypto'06)
where H is an n-bit hash function.
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Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes
Properties
Target collision resistance (TCR): Difficulty in finding m * = m after committing to m and receiving r , such that
If f is c-SPR or e-SPR then H r is TCR.
Signing using H r :
Use SIG algorithm to sign the pair (r , H r (m)).
Certain signature schemes either do not accommodate signing of both r and H r (m) (DSA) or requires implementation changes (RSA).
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Properties
Enhanced target collision resistance (eTCR): Difficulty in finding (r * , m * ) = (r , m) after committing to m and receiving r , such thatH r (m) =H r * (m * ).
If f is c-SPR or e-SPR thenH r is eTCR
Signing usingH r :
Use SIG algorithm to sign justH r (m)
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Known results on randomize-hash-then-sign schemes
Forging signatures based on H r andH r (via off-line) requires: Solving a cryptanalytical problem which is related to finding second preimages in H.
Kelsey-Schneier second preimage attack on H for a message of 2 k blocks in 2 n−k work.
Breaking c-SPR or e-SPR property of f .
To forge randomize-hash-then-sign signatures:
How many queries to the signer are required? What properties of f or H can we exploit?
For how many times we need to play the game of TCR/eTCR?
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Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes Generic forgery of RMX-hash-then-sign schemes (Dang-Perlner)
Attacker Signer 4. Choose some r * , doH r * (m * i ) = h * i and store (h * i , m * i ) in L 2 . 5. Find (r , m) ∈ L 1 and m * ∈ L 2 such thatH r (m) =H r * (m * ). 6. Signature on m is also valid on m * .
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Limitations
Attack does not succeed when:
Same salt r is used for both hashing and signing (DSA, ECDSA, RSA-PSS).
Signatures are based on TCR hashing H r .
We can overcome these limitations when f has fixed points. Davies-Meyer compression function used in many popular hashes such as MD5 and SHA family has this property.
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Forging H-SIG scheme using Dean's method 
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Off-line phase:
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Strengthening digital signatures via randomized hashing Generic forgery attack on RMX-hash-then-sign schemes Forging some randomize-hash-then-sign schemes Complexity: 2 n/2 chosen messages, 2 n/2+1 evaluations of f and 2 n/2 memory
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